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NOTE
THE ADEA IN THE WAKE OF SEMINOLE
I. INTRODUCTION
Everyone, regardless of their sex or race, has at least one
thing in common, we all get older. Nonetheless, attitudes about
our elders in society differ depending on the context. Sometimes
the aged are considered wise; other times they are considered
incompetent. In 1967, Congress attempted to combat age dis-
crimination in the workplace with the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act1 (ADEA or the Act). Congress found that older
Americans faced "disadvantages in their efforts to retain em-
ployment"2 which consisted of arbitrary age limits on employ-
ment notwithstanding that person's skill and job performance.3
Further, Congress prohibited arbitrary age discrimination in a
number of different areas, ranging from employment agency
referrals to pension benefits.4
Congress used its power under the Commerce Clause to enact
the original ADEA 5 In 1974, Congress extended the ADEA
definition of "employer" to the states.6 Unlike the original Act
however, Congress did not specify which provision of the consti-
tution empowered them to include the states under the ADEA's
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
2. Id. § 621(a)(1).
3. See &L § 621(a)(2).
4. See i& § 623(a)-(i).
5. See id. § 621(a)(3); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cL. 3.
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994).
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covereage' Twenty-two years later, in Seminole Tribe of Flori-
da v. Florida,' the Supreme Court ruled that the Indian Gam-
ing Regulatory Act9 (IGRA), which was legislated under the
Indian Commerce Clause, could not abrogate a state's sovereign
immunity from suit.'0 The Court held that Congress could not
make the states amenable to suit because of the Eleventh
Amendment:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."
To reach this decision, the Court overruled Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co.' by declaring that legislation passed pursuant
to the Commerce Clause cannot abrogate the states' sovereign
immu-nity. 13
The adverse effect this ruling could have on the ADEA is
enormous. If the Supreme Court decides that the 1974 Amend-
ments to the Act, which extended coverage of the ADEA to the
states, were passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause, then
any person arbitrarily discriminated against by a state employ-
er because of her age may have no recourse in the federal
courts.'4 Section 630(b) of the ADEA would establish a right
without a remedy; it would be a statute without any teeth.
This paper addresses the effect the Seminole decision will
have on this portion of the Act. Section II briefly examines the
underlying rationale behind Seminole, including the effect on Ex
parte Young.'5 Section III examines the effect Seminole will
have on the ADEA if the Court determines that the Amend-
ments were passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Section
7. See id. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
8. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
9. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
10. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1119.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
12. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
13. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1128.
14. See id at 1127-29.
15. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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IV argues that the 1974 Amendments were not passed under
the Commerce Clause, but were enacted pursuant to Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 Thus, the ability to
bring a suit against a state qua state will be preserved under
the rationale of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.'7 Finally, Section V con-
cludes this examination by predicting the future course the
Court may take concerning the states' potential amenability to
suit under the ADEA.
II. SBEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA V. FLORIDA 8
A. The Decision
On March 27, 1996, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a
five-to-four majority, held that the Indian Commerce Clause
could not be used by Congress to abrogate the states' sovereign
immunity.'9 The Court also held that the state official, in this
case the Governor of Florida, could not be sued under the doc-
trine of Ex parte Young because the IGRA contained a detailed
remedial scheme. 0
The Court reaffirmed the proposition established in Hans v.
Louisiana2' that despite the Eleventh Amendment's text, the
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
17. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The Court found that the Civil War Amendments, most
notably the Fourteenth Amendment, "sanctioned intrusions by Congress" normally
reserved to the states. Id. at 455. Thus, legislation passed pursuant to Section Five
limits the principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amend-
ment. See id. at 456.
18. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). The Seminole Tribe filed suit against the States of
Florida and Alabama to compel negotiations under the IGRA. See Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Seminole, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994). The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida denied the State's motion to dismiss, while the Alabama
District Court granted the motion to dismiss. See id. The Court of Appeals held that
Congress could not abrogate the states' sovereign immunity under the Indian
Commerce Clause, distinguishing Congress' power under the Indian Commerce Clause
from the Commerce Clause. See idi at 1028.
19. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1132; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) (1994). The
Court of Appeals held that Ex parte Young did not apply because negotiating a con-
tract was a discretionary act. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016,
1028 (11th Cir. 1994). According to the Eleventh Circuit, Ex parte Young applies only
to ministerial acts. See id.
20. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1132-33.
21. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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states' sovereign immunity extends to federal question jurisdic-
tion.' In cases where it is alleged that Congress abrogated the
states' sovereign immunity, courts must make two determina-
tions: first, whether Congress "unequivocally expresse[d] its
intent to abrogate the immunity,"' and second, whether Con-
gress acted "pursuant to a valid exercise of power."'
The Court answered the first inquiry in the affirmative. It
concluded that Congress clearly established its intent to abro-
gate the states' sovereign immunity from suit in the IGRA.
The Court, addressing the second inquiry, confronted the deci-
sion of Union Gas." Chief Justice Rehnquist dismissed the
notion that the Hans decision, which established the states'
sovereign immunity in federal question suits only stated a rule
of federal common law. ' Instead, the Court concluded that the
Eleventh Amendment as it applies to federal questions suit is a
constitutional limitation on the "federal courts' jurisdiction un-
der Article III."' The majority based its holding on the prem-
ise that the Eleventh Amendment limited Congress' power un-
der the Commerce Clause, thereby limiting the federal courts'
jurisdiction under Article III.29 Further, and more problematic,
it adopted the rationale from Hans that state sovereign immu-
nity is "inherent" to the nature of sovereignty.
The Court also prevented the Tribe from bringing an Ex
parte Young action against the Governor for failing to follow
22. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122 (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15
(1890)).
23. Id. at 1123 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
24. Id.
25. See id. at 1123-24. The "clear-statement" rule was established in Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238-39 (1985). See also Quern v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332, 345 (1979).
26. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1129.
27. See id. at 1127-28. Justice Souter discusses the federal common law theory of
sovereign immunity in his lengthy dissent. See id. at 1159-78 (Souther, J., dissent-
ing). See also RIcHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
.COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 43 (4th ed. 1996 & Supp. 1996) [hereinafter HART
& WECHSLER]; Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, The Eleventh Amendment, and
State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 75-88 (1988).
28. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1127.
29. See id. at 1128.
30. See id at 1130-31, n.13; see also Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immu-
nity "Exception," 110 HARv. L. REv. 102, 123 (1996) (noting that the meaning of the
word "inherent" is a problematic concept in the area of sovereign immunity).
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section 2710(d)(3) of the IGRA.3' The Court created an anoma-
lous situation. Congress could not subject Florida to the IGRA's
remedial scheme because the statute violated the Eleventh
Amendment, yet the IGRA also barred an Ex parte Young ac-
tion against Governor Chiles because this statute contained a
detailed remedial scheme. 2
Congress intended the state to be subjected to section
2710(d)(7), therefore "[w]here Congress has created a remedial
scheme for the enforcement of a particular federal right, we
have . . . refused to supplement that scheme with one created
by the judiciary."' This principle was adopted from the Bivens'
context, based on the assumption that "Congress is in a better
position to decide whether or not the public interest would be
served by creating" another liability.' The Court declared "the
fact that Congress chose to impose upon the State a liability
which is significantly more limited than would be the liability
imposed upon the state officer under Ex parte Young strongly
indicates that Congress had no wish to create the latter under
[section] 2710(d)(3)."'
The decision in Seminole reflects the Rehnquist Court's dispo-
sition toward protecting the "integrity of state governments
against federal encroachment."36 This trend is reflected in the
Court's holdings from New York v. United States,"7 United
States v. Lopez,3" and Gregory v. Ashcroft.9 In Gregory, the
Court held that Missouri state court judges were "appointees on
the policymaking level"' and, thus, were excluded from the
ADEA." Before reaching this conclusion, the Court described
31. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1132. Section 2710(dX3) is the enforcement provi-
sion of the IGRA which requires the state and the Indian tribe to come up with a
compact. See id. at 1132-33.
32. See id.
33. Id. (quoting Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988)).
34. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 427 (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 386 (1983)).
35. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1133.
36. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Elastic Commerce Clause, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1393 (1994).
37. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
38. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
39. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
40. Id. at 467. T'rjhe term 'employee' shall not include... an appointee on the
policymaking level ... ." 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1994).
41. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 467.
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its view on the role of the states in the federal system. The
Court, speaking through Justice O'Connor, declared that the
"principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses
of government power."42 For this system to be effective, "there
must be a proper balance between the states and the Federal
Government."' The employee challenging a state's decision to
terminate her employment, because of her age, faces this
Court's conviction about federalism.
B. A Rock and a Hard Place
The holding from Seminole could create a constitutional quag-
mire: there may be no forum to enforce a constitutional right.
Seminole may have constructed the proverbial rock and a hard
place. If, as in the case of the IGRA, a statute is deemed to
have been enacted under the commerce clause, and has a de-
tailed remedial scheme, there is no federal forum."
In some cases there may be no state forum either. For in-
stance, federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over federal
antitrust laws.' If Seminole applies to all Article I powers,
and legislation enacted under an Article I power, like antitrust
or copyright law, is deemed to have a detailed remedial scheme
42. Id. at 458.
43. Id. at 459.
44. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1130-34 (1996)
(stating the two holdings of the Court, that the Eleventh Amendment protects the
state from being sued in federal court and the preclusion of Ex parte Young, effec-
tively bars the Seminole Tribe from suing in federal court). See also Monaghan, supra
note 30, at 130 (noting that Congress would prefer some federal court remedy to no
remedy at all); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 27, at 47 (asking whether Congress
would prefer enforcing the federal law against the state official to no judicial remedy
at all).
45. See, e.g., Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373,
379 (1985). The effect Seminole could have on other Article I powers is beyond the
scope of this paper. For a more complete discussion of the effect of sovereign immuni-
ty on federal antitrust and copyright laws prior to Seminole, see H. Stephen Harris,
Jr. & Michael P. Kenney, Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence After Atascadero: The
Coming Clash With Antitrust, Copyright and Other Causes of Action Over Which Fed-
eral Courts Have Exclusive Jurisdiction, 37 EMORY L.J. 645 (1988). Another Article I
power which Seminole could affect is the impairment of the contracts clause. While
the possible effects Seminole has on this clause are unknown, it states that "No State
shall ... pass any... [1law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . ".... U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. If Seminole applies to all Article I powers, this clause could
be severely weakened.
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precluding an Ex parte Young action, then there is no federal
review either. When there is a violation of a constitutionally
protected right there has to be some forum.
The decisions from Battaglia v. General Motors Corporation
and Bartlett v. Bowen47 recognized that Congress' power over
jurisdiction of the courts is limited by the Due Process
Clause." The Bartlett court also suggested that such action
would "remove [ I from the courts an essential judicial function
under our implied constitutional mandate of separation of pow-
ers ....
While the courts in both cases found that Congress could not
preclude both federal and state court jurisdiction, there has
never been a case which squarely decided whether the Court
could withdraw judicial review. 0  The actors may have
changed, but the effect is the same; the litigant is deprived of a
judicial forum. The Due Process Clause, separation of powers
and, federalism concerns should place constitutional limitations
on the Court's ability to preclude judicial review.5 Further-
46. 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948). Employees sued under the FLSA for overtime
compensation, but Congress, in a separate statute, withdrew jurisdiction from the
District Courts while the suits were pending. See id. at 255. The Court of Appeals
side-stepped Congress' bar by holding that it had to ascertain whether it had juris-
diction to hear the claim. See id. at 256. To make its determination, the court
claimed it had to review the merits of the case. See id. at 256-58. The court declared
that Congress' control over 'jurisdiction is subject to compliance with at least the re-
quirements of the Fifth Amendment" Due Process Clause. Id. at 257.
47. 816 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Bartlett, on behalf of her deceased sister, chal-
lenged the constitutionality of Part A of the Medicare Act, alleging that its partial
bar from benefits burdened her sister's free exercise of religion. See id. at 696. The
Secretary of Health and Human Services claimed that the statute precluded federal
jurisdiction, and thus, the Act's constitutionality could not be attacked. See id. at 698.
However, the Court of Appeals held that Congress did not preclude all review. See id.
The court declared that even if Congress meant to exclude all review (federal and
state), this would violate the separation of powers principle implicit in the Consti-
tution. See id. at 703. Excluding the Act from review was also attacked on due pro-
cess grounds by the court. See id. at 704-07.
48. See Bartlett, 816 F.2d at 704-07; Battaglia, 169 F.2d at 257.
49. Bartlett, 816 F.2d at 703.
50. Cf HART & WECHSLER, supra note 27, at 375 (noting that no Supreme Court
case has ever squarely held that there is a constitutional right, in any case involving
a constitutional claim, to a judicial forum).
51. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 27, at 378-79 (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr.,
The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1370-72 (1953); compare Battaglia, 169 F.2d at 254
(holding that Congress' withdrawal of jurisdiction is subject to due process concerns)
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more, the Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is
"inconsistent with the essential function of the federal
courts-to provide a fair and impartial forum for the uniform
interpretation and enforcement of the supreme law of the
land .... "5 2 The analysis from these cases could be extended
to the situation presented by Seminole. Its effect "would be
equivalent to a judicial restraint of federal jurisdiction."'
Nonetheless, a case brought under the ADEA may not reach
this crucial juncture.
III. LIMITED CHOICES FOR THE ADEA PLAINTIFF
If the Court adopts the view that the ADEA's 1974 Amend-
ment, which includes the states as employers, was passed pur-
suant to the Commerce Clause, then the states cannot be sued
directly. If that is the case, a litigant has two choices: one, sue
the state official under an Ex parte Young action, or two, sue
the State in state court.
A. Suing the State in State Court
The ADEA specifies that "[a]ny person aggrieved may bring a
civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal
or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this
Act ... .""' State courts have jurisdiction to try an action
brought under the ADEA; they have concurrent jurisdiction
with federal courts,5 and are bound to uphold the federal law
under the Supremacy Clause.56 Nevertheless, the plaintiff who
sues the state in its court faces an uphill battle.
with Bartlett, 816 F.2d at 695 (holding that withdrawal of all forms of judicial review
violates the separation of powers principle and the due process clause).
52. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 207, 255-56 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also Harris & Kenny, supra note 45 (arguing that the decision from
Atascadero could undermine the broad reach of the National Government over anti-
trust and copyright laws).
53. Harris & Kenny, H. Stephen Harris, Jr. & Michael P. Kenny, (emphasis in
original).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
55. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458-59 (1990).
56. U.S. CONST. art. VI; see Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 458-59.
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A state's consent to be sued in its court has no effect on the
exercise of jurisdiction in the lower federal courts.57 Nonethe-
less, the Supreme Court may review a state court decision of
federal law on appeal from the state's highest court.58 In
Cohens v. Virginia,59 Chief Justice Marshall established the
right of Supreme Court review of state court judgments where
the State was one of the participants and the decision rested on
federal law.60
The Court in Seminole suggested, probably erroneously, that
in order for a state to be sued in its own court it must consent
to suit.6 If this is the case, many states, such as Virginia,
would probably not give their consent.62 It is questionable
whether an ADEA suit brought in state court against the state
can be heard in that court. In Howlett v. Rose' the Court
held, in a section 1983 action against a local school board, that
sovereign immunity will not protect the municipality because
under the statute's definition it was a "person," and not an arm
of the state." The Court reasoned that, through the Suprema-
cy Clause, federal law is enforceable in state courts. Since mu-
nicipalities are deemed "persons" under section 1983, a state's
determination that they are protected by state common-law
57. See Jackson, supra note 27, at 26-28.
58. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); see also Jack-
son, supra note 27, at 26-29.
59. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
60. See id. The Eleventh Amendment prevents lower federal courts from hearing
claims against the state. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114,
1121-22 (1996). The Supreme Court, on appeal from the state's highest court, can
hear a suit against the state. See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). These two
outcomes illustrate the anomalous interpretation of the Court's Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence. See Jackson, supra note 27, at 15-16. If the case is brought in a feder-
al district court, without the state's consent, there is no federal jurisdiction. However,
if a state consents to be sued in its own court, federal review is possible if the Su-
preme Court grants certiorari to hear the appeal. See id. at 29-30.
61. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1131 n.14. See also Monaghan, supra note 30, at
125 n.161 (noting that the Court's suggestion is incorrect).
62. See, e.g., Messina v. Burden, 321 S.E.2d 657 (1984). The Virginia Supreme
Court noted that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is "alive and well" in the Com-
monwealth. Id. at 660. Also, in Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990), the Florida
courts went to great lengths to protect the school board under the guise of sovereign
immunity. See id. at 360-61.
63. 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
64. See id. at 376.
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immunity has no force in a state court interpreting federal
law."
Nevertheless, the Court also declared that a state does not
have to "entertain in its own courts suits from which it was
immune in federal court."66 Thus, the Court's interpretation of
the ADEA Amendment may also effect the possibility of state
judicial review. If the Court decides that the ADEA Amendment
was enacted under the Commerce Clause, and Seminole applies,
the ADEA plaintiff cannot sue a state in its own courts.67 It
would be anomalous for a state court to entertain a suit, based
on federal law, when a federal court has no jurisdiction to hear
it.
68
B. Ex parte Young 9
The Court determined that a state official could be sued in
her official capacity in Ex parte Young.7" The fiction is this:
[If an] act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional,
and if it be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce
an unconstitutional act to the injury of the complainants is
a proceeding without the authority of and one which does
not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capaci-
ty."71
65. See id. at 367, 376.
66. Id. at 365.
67. See id. The Court held that section 1983 does not "override the traditional
sovereign immunity of the States." Id. It also reiterated the Coures previous holding
from Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), that those
arms of the state "which have traditionally enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity"
under section 1983 are not subject to suit in state or federal court. Id. This line of
reasoning could be extended to the ADEA. If it is extended to the ADEA, it seeming-
ly contradicts another line of holdings from the Court which says that the Eleventh
Amendment has no application in state courts. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note
27, at 46 (citing Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) for support). However, instead
of relying on the Eleventh Amendment, the state could impose a claim of common
law sovereign immunity, thus withholding consent. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1131
n.14; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 27, at 46.
68. See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 365.
69. 209 U.S. 123 (1907).
70. See id.
71. Id. at 159.
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Therefore, this fiction is used "to permit the federal courts to
vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsi-
ble.... "72 Nonetheless, an Ex parte Young action can only
seek prospective relief, and not retroactive relief for monetary
damages. 3
The ADEA provides that a violation of section 623 will be
deemed a violation of section 215 of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA).74 If an employer violates the ADEA, it owes the
wrongfully discharged employee "unpaid minimum wages or
unpaid overtime compensation" for purposes of sections 216 and
217 of the FLSA.75 An employer could also be liable for liqui-
dated damages if it has willfully violated the ADEA. 7 6
A litigant cannot recover a retroactive monetary award
against the states' coffers.7' The Court in Edelman recognized
the fiction behind an Ex parte Young action: when a state offi-
cer is sued there is enough state action for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but not for the Eleventh Amend-
ment." Thus, as the Court in Edelman concluded, a court can
only award prospective relief against the state official. To
award retroactive relief would ignore the constraints of the
Eleventh Amendment.79 Prospective injunctive relief also "pre-
vent[s] a continuing violation of federal law.""0 While the Sem-
72. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984). The
Court refused to extend federal court jurisdiction in suits against state officials based
on state law. It found that the Ex parte Young fiction was established to promote the
supremacy of federal law. Thus, when a state official has violated state law, there is
no need to invoke the fiction of Ex parte Young. See id. at 107.
73. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (holding that retroactive relief
cannot be paid from the state treasury).
74. See ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994); FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 215 (1994).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1994); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 216-17 (1994).
76. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994).
77. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663-64. The ADEA allows a plaintiff to recover lost
wages in the form of minimum wage or overtime, and where there has been a willful
violation she can recover liquidated damages. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994) Nonethe-
less, these remedies are retroactive against the state. The 'Virginia Supreme Court
provided a good example of how state courts will treat monetary claims against a
state's treasury in Messina v. Burden, 321 S.E.2d 657 (1984). The court stated, in a
tort action against Virginia, that the legislature must expressly remove sovereign
immunity, otherwise the action cannot be brought in state court. See id. at 660-62.
78. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 676-77; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 27, at 1077-
79.
79. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664.
80. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). The Court held that federal courts
8891997]
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inole decision may have all but destroyed a private citizen's
ability to bring a suit against the states under the Commerce
Clause, it has also limited the doctrine of Ex parte Young."'
A state employee bringing an Ex parte Young action against
her supervisor, not the state itself, must confront the ruling
from Seminole. Seminole states that a federal court cannot
award prospective relief under Ex parte Young where Congress
has already provided a detailed remedial scheme. 2 Therefore,
the courts will examine the Act's enforcement provisions. The
rationale behind Seminole indicates that the ADEA is not as
comprehensive as the IGRA.'
The ADEA specifically provides that a court enforcing this
Act "shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable
relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this
Act ... ."" Ex parte Young actions seek to enforce federal law
by ending violations of a federal statute and preventing future
violations."m Clearly, the language of the Act indicates that
Congress left open the possibility of an Ex parte Young
remedy. 6
Conversely, the IGRA did not leave open the possibility of
other remedies. 7 As interpreted by the Court, IGRA's section
2710(d)(3) prescribes that if the state fails to negotiate in good
cannot issue declaratory judgments against state officials when the state no longer
violates the contested action. See id. at 72-73. The Court reasoned that the declarato-
ry judgment was more similar to a monetary award than to prospective relief. The
majority also ruled that the declaratory judgment might have a preclusive effect in
state courts. See id. at 73. One commentator has criticized Green for muddying up
the already confusing Eleventh Amendment doctrine, ignoring precedent, and being
internally inconsistent. See Jackson, supra note 27, at 62-72.
81. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
82. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1132.
83. See id. at 1132-34 (1996). The Court stated that "Congress intended therein
not only to define, but also significantly limit, the duty imposed by § 2710(d)(3)." Id
at 1132. The ADEA, however, provides that a "court shall have jurisdiction to grant
such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this
Act . ." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994). The ADEA supplies the courts with other rem-
edies.
84. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994).
85. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
86. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994).
87. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. 1132-33. But see, Monaghan, supra note 30, at 130
(noting that Congress probably would have preferred some remedy over nothing at
all).
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faith, the parties must compact within sixty days." If they fail
to reach a compact, each party must submit a proposed compact
to a mediator. 9 If the state fails to abide by the mediator's
compact, the Secretary of the Interior determines what regula-
tions will govern.9 ° Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that
Congress, by imposing this "modest set of sanctions,"91 meant
to exclude any sanction that would expose state officials to the
"full remedial powers of a federal court."92 The ADEA, unlike
the IGRA, specifically allows the courts to enforce other rem-
edies not mentioned in the statute. 3 Thus, the intent the
Court found in Seminole concerning IGRA section 2710(d)(3),
would not be present in an ADEA lawsuit.
The view taken by the Court in Seminole, however, affords
the Seminole Tribe a right without a remedy, which is a glar-
ing weakness that the Court does not address.' One commen-
tator suggests that the Court could have declared that the suit
against Governor Chiles "failed to state a claim for relief."5
The Seminole Tribe had no statutory claim against Governor
Chiles, and accordingly, no remedy.8 Unlike the IGRA, the
ADEA provides a right in the employee who has been arbitrari-
ly dismissed because of her age.97 She can seek relief against
her employer in the form of an Ex parte Young action.
What is problematic about an Ex parte Young action in the
ADEA context is that by the time the suit actually gets to
court, it may be too late. The person suing may have lost inter-
est and time, something very precious to someone who is close
to retiring. Lost wages, pension benefits, and overtime compen-
sation are not recoverable under Ex parte Young." Conse-
quently, reinstatement is the most likely remedy. Justice
88. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1132-33.
89. See id-
90. See U at 1133.
91. I&
92. Id- at 1133 n.17.
93. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994).
94. See Monaghan, supra note 30, at 129; see generally Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (recognizing that where a right has been violated the
laws, and the courts interpreting those laws, provide a remedy).
95. Monaghan, supra note 30, at 130-31.
96. See id. at 131.
97. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994).
98. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994).
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Brennan recognized the defects of an Ex parte Young remedy in
his dissenting opinion from Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon.99
In Atascadero, a mentally disabled student sued the state for
damages under the Rehabilitation Act."° Justice Brennan not-
ed that a litigant suing the state under Ex parte Young must
follow a rigid set of rules. She must "remember" to name the
official rather than the state as the defendant, and can only
seek prospective relief..1 It took six years for the suit to final-
ly be decided against Scanlon, the plaintiff. Scanlon's reward
for his perseverance was dismissal of his suit because of the
Eleventh Amendment."° The dissent recognized that a "dam-
ages award may often be the only practical remedy available to
the plaintiff, and the threat of a damages award may be the
only effective deterrent to a defendant's willful violation of
federal law.""° The only effective remedy for an ADEA plain-
tiff is a damages award. Like Scanlon, "it is damages or noth-
ing" for the ADEA litigant.1 4 If, as in Atascadero, she has to
wait six years for her case to be decided, she may be ready for
retirement. Consequently, the state obtains its desired goal: the
retirement of an older employee. If an Ex parte Young remedy
is the only recourse a wrongly discharged employee has in fed-
eral court, the ADEA's bark may be worse than its bite.
The potential problems addressed in the Ex parte Young and
state court contexts can be avoided in an ADEA suit. The Court
should conclude that the 1974 Amendment to the ADEA, ex-
tending the coverage of the Act to include the states, was en-
acted under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. There-
fore, the state, and state actors, should be amenable to suit
under the ADEA.
99. 473 U.S. 234, 247-58 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). Scanlon alleged that the hospital denied him employ-
ment as a graduate student because of his disability. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at
236. The Court held that since the state was not expressly named in the statute,
Congress did not intend to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. See id. at 245-46.
101. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 256.
102. See id at 256-57 n.9.
103. Id, at 256-57.
104. Id. at 256-57 n.9 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403
U.S. 388, 410 (1971)).
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IV. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE RESCUE?
The Supreme Court has never answered whether the ADEA's
1974 Amendment was passed pursuant to Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court had an opportuni-
ty to address this issue in EEOC v. Wyoming"° and Gregory
v. Ashcroft.1 Nevertheless, in both situations the Court de-
clined to decide the issue. The Court, in Wyoming, declared
that "[w]e need not decide whether [the ADEA Amendment]
could also be upheld as an exercise of Congress' powers under
[Section Five] of the Fourteenth Amendment."' More recent-
ly, the Court in Gregory avoided the question by holding that
the Missouri state judges were appointees "on the policy mak-
ing level," a specific exception under the ADEA.'"
In Gregory, the Court conceded that if the ADEA Amendment
was passed under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment
the "concerns about federal intrusion into state government that
compel the result in this case might carry less weight.""s The
Court intimated, in very strong terms, that it would still find
for Missouri because Congress did not explicitly impose obliga-
tions on the states' selection of its judges under Congress' Sec-
tion Five Powers; the Court declared that the "Fourteenth
Amendment does not override all principles of federalism."1
In essence, the Court was more concerned with federalism than
with the possible discriminatory effect of Missouri's Constitu-
tional provision requiring mandatory retirement at seventy
years of age.111
105. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
106. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
107. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 243-44.
108. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 466-67. The Court declared that if Congress had wanted
judges included in the ADEA, it would have made its intentions clear. See id. at 467.
109. I& at 468.
110. Id. at 469.
111. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause,
47 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1393-94 (1994). The authors assert that the Court is reluc-
tant to interfere with the states' core function of governance without a clear, explicit
statement by Congress. See id at 1394.
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A. The Seventh Circuit's Interpretation of the ADEA
Amendment"
Age is not a "suspect classification" under Equal Protection
Clause standards." However, if Congress acted under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, then it can ensure equal
protection under the law as long as that law is "plainly adopted
to that end. . . . "" The language of the Act and the relevant
legislative history of the ADEA and Title VII prove that the
Amendment to the ADEA guaranteed equal protection under
the law."
1. The Case Law
While the Supreme Court may be bashful about deciding the
issue, some circuits have expressly dealt with it and concluded
that the ADEA Amendment, extending the definition of employ-
er to include the states, was enacted pursuant to Congress'
legislative power under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' The Seventh Circuit addressed this issue in
EEOC v. Elrod." It held that the 1974 Amendment to the
ADEA was a constitutional exercise of Congress' power under
112. The Seventh Circuit is not the only circuit to adopt this interpretation. The
Tenth and First Circuits have also found that the ADEA Amendment was passed
pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Hurd v. Pittsburgh State
Univ., 821 F. Supp. 1410, 1413 (D. Kan. 1993), affd, 29 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 321 (1994); Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694,
700 (1st Cir. 1983).
113. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976).
114. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
115. See Ramirez, 715 F.2d at 700; EEOC v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601, 605-08 (7th Cir.
1982).
116. See Davidson v. Board of Governors, 920 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1990); Ramirez,
715 F.2d at 700; Hurd, 821 F. Supp. at 1413. But see Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum
Corp., 77 F.3d 690 (3d Cir. 1996); MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 938 F.
Supp. 785 (N.D. Ala. 1996).
The Fourth Circuit held that Congress adopted the ADEA Amendment under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment in Arrit v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th
Cir. 1977). However, that decision was questioned in Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore,
731 F.2d 209, 214-15 (4th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 472 U.S. 353 (1985). But see Taylor v.
Virginia, 951 F. Supp. 591, 599 (E.D. Va. 1996) (noting that under the ADEA, a
legislative purpose was found to have invoked the Fourteenth Amendment).
117. 674 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1982).
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Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment."u In so holding,
the court determined that the proper inquiry was whether the
ADEA Amendment was "'plainly adapted' to the end of enforc-
ing the Equal Protection Clause, and is 'not prohibited by but
is consistent with the letter and spirit of the
[C]onstitution, '" ' The court recognized the broad legislative
powers of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to
carry out the objects the amendments have in view, what-
ever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they
contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of per-
fect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the
laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is
brought within the domain of congressional power.'°
The Seventh Circuit used the legislative history of the 1974
Amendment, as well as the similarity between Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964' and the ADEA, to show that the
ADEA Amendment extending the coverage to the states was
passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.'
The court focused on the limited legislative history of the Act
to buttress its reasoning. Senator Bentsen, an early supporter
of the ADEA Amendment, expressed his concern about age
discrimination by state employers in 1972 when he said:
there is mounting evidence that employees of...
State[s] ... are being denied that free choice between pro-
ductive work or adequate retirement income. In fact, there
are strong indications that the hiring and firing practices of
governmental units discriminate against the elderly ....
The legislation I introduce today is intended to close the
loophole in present law and to bring Government employees
within the jurisdiction of the age discrimination law.'
118. See iU at 603.
119. Id at 604 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)).
120. Id at 604 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879)).
121. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 715 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to
e-17 (1994)).
122. See EEOC v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601, 604-09 (7th Cir. 1982).
123. 118 CONG. REC. 7745 (Mar. 9, 1972) (statements by Senator Bentsen).
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At the time, Senator Bentsen's proposal did not make it out of
the House-Senate conference committee. Nonetheless, he ex-
pressed similar sentiments when the Amendment, substantially
comparable to his earlier proposal, was passed two years lat-
er.' The legislative history does not specifically reference the
Fourteenth Amendment, but it does indicate Congress' intention
to bring the states within the age discrimination laws.' It
illustrates Congress' efforts to provide elderly Americans equal
protection under the law as it applies to the states. 26
2. The Ratchet Theory: Roadblock or Permissible Extension of
Congressional Power?
The Court may also have to confront the ratchet theory in a
future ADEA case. The ratchet theory says that Congress can
elevate certain rights under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment when the Court has not seen fit to do so.'27 The
current debate about the ratchet theory centers around the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).' The theory was
124. See 120 CONG. REC. 8768 (1974) (statements by Senator Bentsen). The lan-
guage of Senator Bentsen's amendment proposal from 1972 is similar to the 1974
Amendment. The Senator's proposal for 29 U.S.C. § 630(bX2), as it related to the
states, said the Amendment should apply to "a State or political subdivision thereof,
and any agency or instrumentality of the foregoing." 118 CONG. REc. 7746 (Mar. 9,
1972) (statements by Senator Bentsen). The language is substantially the same in the
Act: "[A] State or a political subdivision [thereof] and any agency or instrumentality
of a State, or political subdivision of a State, and any interstate agency .... " 29
U.S.C. § 630(b)(2) (1994) (the italicized language notes the changes between the Act
and Senator Bentsen's proposal). The only difference between the two is that the
word "foregoing" was substituted for the italicized language. See id.
125. See Elrod, 674 F.2d at 607-08. ("The 1974 ADEA Amendment differs from the
1972 Title VII amendments only in lacking explicit reference to the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
126. See Hurd v. Pittsburgh State Univ., 821 F. Supp. 1410, 1412 (D. Kan. 1993),
affd, 29 F.3d 564, 565 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 321 (1994); Ramirez
v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 700-01 (1st Cir. 1983); Elrod, 674 F.2d at
605, 607.
127. See Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, 56 MONT. L. REV.
145, 154-55 (1995); Matt Pawa, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional
Rights, Can Congress Save Us? An Examination of Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1029, 1062-69 (1993); Marci A. Hamilton, The Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox Into the Henhouse Under Cover of
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDOZA L. REV. 357, 375-76 (1994).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 127; Joanne C.
Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at its Word: The Implication for RFRA and Sepa-
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developed in the Voting Rights Cases of the late 1960s and
early 1970s,' beginning with the Supreme Court's decision in
Katzenbach v. Morgan."' In an important footnote to that de-
cision, Justice Brennan insisted that Congress could only adopt
legislation which enforced provisions under the Fourteenth
Amendment."' In later decisions, the Court held that Con-
gress could not ratchet down an equal protection right.1"2
Nonetheless, the uncertainty surrounding the theory is whether
Congress can ratchet up rights that have not been recognized
by the Court.
Some commentators have suggested that Congress does not
have this power."3 To support this proposition, they cite the
Court's decision from Oregon v. Mitchell.' Four Justices in
Mitchell decided that Congress could establish voting age re-
quirements on the states; four others rejected this notion argu-
ing that Morgan should only apply to discrete and insular mi-
norities.' 5 Justice Black believed that federalism concerns
prohibited Congress from establishing a voting age requirement
on the states, and left open the question whether Congress
could legislate under the Fourteenth Amendment in contexts
ration of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REV. 5, 33 (1995). Almost an entire issue of the fifty-
sixth volume of the Montana Law Review was devoted to the debate swirling around
RFRA. 56 MONT. L. REv. 5 (1995).
129. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
130. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
131. See Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651-52 n.10.
132. See, e.g., University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732-33 (1982).
133. David 0. Conckle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional
Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39, 46, 50 (1995); Jona-
than Kieffer, A Line in the Sanck Difficulties in Discerning the Limits of Con-
gressional Power as Illustrated by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 44 U. KAN.
L. REV. 601, 618-20 (1996).
134. 400 U.S. 112 (1970). See, e.g., Kieffer, supra note 133, at 618-21.
135. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White believed that Congress could act under
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment against the states. See Mitchell, 400 U.S.
at 231-40. Justice Douglass wrote separately and held that Congress had the power
to extend the age requirement in the Voting Rights Act to the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 141-44. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Burger
and Blackmun, maintained that Congress could not impose voting age requirements
on the states based on age because it was not a discrete and insular minority. See
id. at 296. Justice Harlan also declared that there was no invidious discrimination
against 18-21 year olds, and that the Voting Rights Act was not "valid as declaratory
of the meaning of that clause [Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment]." Id. at
212-13.
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other than race."' Nevertheless, the Court has "acknowledged
congressional power to go beyond judicial interpretation of the
Reconstruction Amendments." 1
7
Proponents of the ratchet theory contend that it is "consistent
with the intent of the Framers and the purposes of the consti-
tutional protections of individual liberty."" This is the better
reasoned view. If the principle behind the enactment of Section
Five was to safeguard individual rights, then Congress should
be able to legislate in order to protect those rights." This
principle is embodied in our system of governance; the
"separation of powers is 'essential to the preservation of liberty'
and it is necessary to give 'those who administer each depart-
ment the necessary constitutional means and personal motives
to resist encroachments of the others.""' ° When the Court is
confronted with a ratchet issue it must decide "whether the
powers of the other branches are limited by the Court's inter-
pretation when the Court finds no constitutional right and
issues no order against the other branches [of government]."'
Congress can protect older Americans from arbitrary age
discrimination in employment.' The Court upheld a Congres-
sional statute that protected a non-suspect class in Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer." When Fitzpatrick was decided, the minimum stan-
dard of scrutiny controlled in equal protection challenges to
gender discrimination absent a statute.'" Further, the Court
136. See id. at 131-34.
137. Laycock, supra note 127, at 155 (citing Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547, 563-66 (1990) in support of the proposition).
138. Pawa, supra note 127, at 1069.
139. Laycock, supra note 127, at 160. "he principle [behind section five] was to
multiply the institutions capable of protecting federal rights because it was not safe
to rely exclusively on any single institution." Id.
140. Laycock, supra note 127, at 162 n.81 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 321-
22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossier ed., 1961)).
141. Laycock, supra note 127, at 155.
142. See Comment, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Will the Court get the
Hint? Congress' Attempt to Raise the Status of Persons with Disabilities in Equal
Protection Cases, 15 PACE L. REV. 621, 627 (1995). The author recognized that older
persons are an example of a class of people who have not been afforded special pro-
tection by the Court, but Congress has seen fit to supply them with special protec-
tion. See id. at 627.
143. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
144. See Pawa, supra note 127, at 1076-77. Fitzpatrick was decided six months
before the Court "bumped up" gender discrimination to an intermediate level of scru-
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had two opportunities to hold that age discrimination against
the states was not enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment
and did not address the issue.' While the Court has held
that age is not a "suspect classification,"' it has never held
that the ADEA infringes on other constitutionally protected
rights (i.e., the Court has not issued an order against Congress
in the age discrimination context). Therefore, Congress can
safeguard the rights of elderly Americans against the states
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The path of the ADEA and Title VII also augments the con-
tention that Congress intended the ADEA's Amendment to be
enacted under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
3. Title VII and the ADEA
Title VII was originally passed under the Commerce Clause,
and was designed to reach the private sector.' It was later
extended to the states in a subsequent Amendment. 9 The
ADEA was also originally passed under the Commerce Clause.
Like Title VII, the ADEA was extended to include the states in
a later Amendment.' When Congress amended Title VII to
include the states, however, it specified which constitutional
provision it was acting under, i.e., Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment." Further, subsequent ADEA case law
has also adopted rulings from the Title VII context. 52
On the surface, it would seem odd that both statutes were
originally enacted under the Commerce Clause and only applied
to the private sector. Congress frequently uses the Commerce
Clause to legislate in social areas, an area of legislating author-
ity that on its face does not address any social concerns."5
tiny in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
145. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
146. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976).
147. See, e.g., Elrod, 674 F.2d at 607.
148. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
149. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 103.
150. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994).
151. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 2.
152. See HOWARD C. EGLIT, AGE DISCRIMINATION § 11.11, at 11-43 to 11-44 (2d ed.
1994).
153. See Eskridge, Jr. & Ferejohn, supra note 111, at 1384-95.
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However, when Congress legislates under the Commerce
Clause, it occupies the field.' When Congress intends to
transform the "usual constitutional balance between the State
and the Federal Government," 55 it must make a "super-clear"
statement in the relevant statute.' Congress has made its
intention known in both statutes. 7 When determining wheth-
er the states are subject to suit, this is one of the factors feder-
al courts must consider.'58 Both Title VII and the ADEA meet
the "super-clear" statement rule.159
The Supreme Court recognized in Lorillard v. Pons"50 that
the purpose of the ADEA and Title VII was to eliminate dis-
crimination in the workplace.16 The Court, speaking through
Justice Marshall, proclaimed that "[i]n fact, the prohibitions of
the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII."5 2
Therefore, when Congress extended the ADEA to the states, the
"objective of the legislation was within Congress' power under
the [Fourteenth] Amendment.""6  Congress in passing the
ADEA's Amendment, acted under Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
B. Another Interpretation
In MacPherson v. University of Montevallo,' the Northern
District of Alabama took the opposite approach from the Sev-
enth, Tenth and First Circuits." The court held that the
ADEA's Amendment was enacted under the Commerce Clause,
not the Fourteenth Amendment." The court found it unlikely
154. See id.
155. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
156. See id.; Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984).
157. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (a), (b), (i) (1994).
158. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1123 (1996).
159. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (a), (b), (i) (1994).
160. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
161. See id. at 584.
162. Id
163. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 473 (1980) (emphasis added).
164. 938 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Ala. 1996).
165. See id. at 786. The plaintiffs, two associate college professors, alleged that the
University discriminated against them because of their age in favor of their younger
colleagues.
166. See id. at 789.
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that Congress failed to mention the Fourteenth Amendment
when it revised the ADEA, btit remembered it two years earlier
when Congress amended Title VII. 67 MacPherson also found
Chief Justice Burger's dissent from Wyoming persuasive when
he argued that the ADEA could not have been passed under
the Fourteenth Amendment.'
However, it appears the MacPherson court may have misap-
plied the Chief Justice's argument. In Wyoming, the dissent
addressed the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on the
Tenth Amendment, not on sovereign immunity."6 9 Further,
Chief Justice Burger offered this caveat, "[t]his is not to say
definitively that age discrimination is not protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment because this case does not squarely
raise that issue."170 Fundamentally, he believed that choosing
state employees was a local function for the state, not for the
Congress.Y
Taylor v. Virginia,'72 in contrast to the MacPherson deci-
sion, followed the Court's precedent from the Fullilove line of
cases. 3 The court held that the inquiry for legislation enact-
ed pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment is
whether the statute "'may be regarded as an enactment to the
Equal Protection Clause... [if it] is plainly adopted to that
end and whether it is not prohibited but is consistent with the
letter and spirit of the Constitution."' A recital of constitu-
tional power is unnecessary, but it must recognize the
Amendment's objectives. 5 Furthermore, the court explicitly
167. See id. at 789 n.6.
168. See iUL at 789.
169. See Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 259-60 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
170. I. at 261 n.7.
171. See id at 264.
172. 951 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. Va. 1996). In Taylor, the plaintiffs sought overtime
compensation from the Virginia Department of Transportation based on section 207(a)
of the FISA. See icd at 592-93. The court contrasted the ADEA with the FLSA, not-
ing that the ADEA evidenced a "legislative purpose to invoke the Fourteenth Amend-
ment... ." Id- at 599.
173. Congress does not have to repeat the words "section 5" or "Fourteenth
Amendment" or "equal protection." See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476-78
(1980).
174. Taylor, 951 F. Supp. at 597 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,
651 (1966)).
175. See Ud at 598.
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recognized that a "legislative purpose to invoke the Fourteenth
Amendment" is found in the ADEA.75
When enacting legislation under Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment, Congress does not need to "recite the words
'section five' or 'Fourteenth Amendment' or 'equal pro-
tection' ... This statement contradicts the Court's state-
ment in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman
(Pennhurst I)' that Congress must explicitly state its inten-
tion to legislate under Section Five."9 While it is unfortunate
that the 1974 Amendment to the Act does not refer to the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court's ruling in Pennhurst I
should not be an issue.
If a state raises the Eleventh Amendment as a defense in an
ADEA action, the Fourteenth Amendment does not have to be
expressly referenced because the state is challenging the consti-
tutional validity of the statute.' The Court in Wyoming dif-
ferentiated Pennhurst I by noting that in Pennhurst I, the
Court construed a statute, it did not decide its constitutional
validity.' In a future case before the Court, concerning
whether or not Congress acted pursuant to its Section Five
powers under the Fourteenth Amendment when it extended
coverage of the ADEA to the states, the rule from Pennhurst I
should not apply. The Court will be addressing whether or not
Congress acted properly under Section Five, not whether the
ADEA created any rights against the state. 82 The issue before
176. Id. at 599. Accord Teichgraeber v. Memorial Union Corp. of the Emporia
State Univ., 946 F. Supp. 900 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that Congress abrogated the
states' sovereign immunity in the ADEA under the Fourteenth Amendment).
177. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 244 n.18 (1983); see, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S.
at 476-78 (1980).
178. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
179. See id. at 15.
180. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1125 (1996). The
Court held that when Congress seeks to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity, one
of the questions it must ask is whether "the Act in question [was] passed pursuant
to a constitutional provision granting Congress the power to abrogate?" Id. Further,
the Court noted that since Union Gas interpreted the Constitution, its holding can
only be altered through a "constitutional amendment or revision by this Court." Id. at
1128. As in Union Gas, the Court also interpreted the Constitution in Seminole. See
id. at 1131. Therefore, the Court must decide the constitutionality of the statute in
question.
181. See Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 244 n.18 (citations omitted).
182. See id.
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the Court will be a constitutional one concerning the Eleventh
and Fourteenth Amendments and the ADEA. Therefore, the
interpretation of the MacPherson court lacks merit considering
the Supreme Court's precedent in this area.
C. The ADEA was Enacted Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Congress' motives for extending the protection of the ADEA
to include the states will be ignored if the ADEA Amendment is
found to be enacted under the Commerce Clause.'r The role
of the federal courts is to uphold the federal laws as enacted by
Congress."s Imposing the Eleventh Amendment in an area
where the goal is to enforce the age discrimination laws
frustrates the will of Congress." Finding that the Amend-
ment was enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment gives
effect to the goals of Congress.
The Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzere held that the Four-
teenth Amendment can "provide for private suits against States
or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in
other contexts." 8 ' The Seminole decision reaffirmed
Fitzpatrick's holding." Further, Congress may legislate, under
the Fourteenth Amendment, what it determines is 'appropriate
legislation' for the purpose of enforcing provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment .... .18' The provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment that Congress enforced when it extended the
ADEA's coverage to include the states, was the Equal Protec-
tion Clause." ° Congress can enforce a constitutional provision
183. Cf Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,- 473 U.S. 234, 255 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan believed that the majority's decision in Atascadero, and
the Eleventh Amendment in general, obstructed the goals of Congress which are
properly "within reach of its Article I powers." Id. See also Harris & Kenny, supra
note 45, at 650-57 (arguing that the decision from Atascadero could undermine
Congress' goals in the antitrust and copyright context).
184. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 255 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
185. See, e.g., EEOC v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601, 604-05 (7th Cir. 1982).
186. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). In Fitzpatrick, the petitioners brought a class action suit
alleging that Connecticuts retirement benefit plan discriminated against them on the
basis of their sex, in violation of Title VII. See id at 445.
187. Id at 456 (citations omitted).
188. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1125.
189. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.
190. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1; see Hurd v. Pittsburgh State Univ., 821 F.
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"employ[ing] the means necessary" to achieve its purpose. 9' If,
as the Seminole decision suggests, Congress can only provide
for private suits against the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the only logical conclusion the Court can reach
concerning the Act's Amendment is that it was passed under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Amendment
seeks to combat age discrimination; that which is not tolerated
in the private sector, should also not be tolerated in the public
sector.
V. CONCLUSION
State governments employ over fifteen million people,"2 a
great number of who are older Americans. If Seminole is fol-
lowed, state employees may have lost some of their protections
against arbitrary discrimination based on their age. There may
be no federal forum to bring their claims against the state, and
at the very least they will have lost some very effective reme-
dies.93 The time is ripe for the Court to decide whether the
states retain their sovereign immunity in an ADEA suit. The
circuits are split, and the law is far from clear.
The Court must make a decision. There are two likely possi-
bilities that the Court could reach. First, the Court could deter-
mine that the ADEA's Amendment was legislated under the
Commerce Clause. In this scenario, Seminole applies and the
Eleventh Amendment would bar a suit against the states.
Nonetheless, under Ex parte Young a litigant could sue the
state official who fired her in contravention of the ADEA.'T
Supp. 1410, 1413 (D. Kan. 1993), affd, 29 F.3d 564, 565 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. de-
nied, 115 S. Ct. 321 (1994); Davidson v. Board of Governors, 920 F.2d 441, 443 (7th
Cir. 1990); Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 700 (1st Cir. 1983).
191. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
192. See ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
GE192-1, PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT: 1992 9 (1994).
193. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
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That portion of Seminole addressing Ex parte Young suits
should not apply to the ADEA." Many remedies provided in
the ADEA, however, would not apply because they are retroac-
tive monetary awards.' The ADEA litigant could also at-
tempt to sue the state in state court. However, it is question-
able whether she can bring any action in state court against
the state."7
Second, the Court could find that the ADEA Amendment was
passed pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The purpose of the Act's Amendment is to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." s The ADEA
Amendment insures the state employee and the privte sector
employee are afforded the same treatment and rights under the
law. As a result, the ADEA plaintiff easily clears both of
Seminole's hurdles.' Congress plainly intended to subject the
states to suit under the ADEA.2 ° Further, Congress legislated
under a constitutional provision that limits the states' sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.2"' The Court, us-
ing this theory, should find the ADEA Amendment constitution-
al, which would save older Americans and their attorneys a lot
of headaches.
Which way the Court will decide is open for debate. Nonethe-
less, the prospects do not look good for the ADEA litigant who
tries the case before this Court. Even if the Court decides that
the ADEA Amendment was passed under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it may elect not to hear the case any-
way based on principles of federalism.2 2 The Seminole deci-
195. See id.
196. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
197. See supra Part I.A.
198. See supra Part IV.
199. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 6, 157-59 and accompanying text.
201. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
202. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 469 (1991). The Court declared that
the 'Fourteenth Amendment does not override all principles of federalism." Id. As one
commentator suggested, before the ruling from Seminole, the Court may balance a
"State's interest in its immunity against the federal government's interest in the
supremacy of its laws to determine when Congress has the power to strip the States'
sovereign immunity." Note, Congressional Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 1436, 1440 (1986). Some of the language from Gregory suggests that
the Court may pursue this route if a State is sued under a statute passed pursuant
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sion may have been an aberration, a momentary lapse of rea-
son. If not, it will effect thousands of older Americans in the
workplace. It also fundamentally alters our federal system of
government; rights once enforceable against the states no longer
exist.
Edward P. Noonan*
to the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 468-70.
* The author would like to thank Professor Leslie Kelleher for her helpful com-
ments, the University of Richmond Law Review staff and Jennifer Maid.
